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Approaches to Cross-Strait Relations

民進黨對兩岸問題的看法

蔡英文主席於喬治華盛頓大學演講

Washington D.C.

2009年5月6日

 

 

兩岸關係不只是在台灣安全、經濟及政治等方面的重要政策議題，更是與美國利益以及區域考量息息相關。

 

自去年台灣的政黨輪替後，兩岸關係有了重大的變化。主要在於馬總統積極向中國示好，不僅宣示了國共兩黨結束長久以來的敵對狀態，也讓兩邊的政府關係更加緊密。

 

乍看之下，這種緩和緊張和擁抱對方的政策，似乎營造了兩岸和諧的氣氛。緊張的情勢的確減緩了，而對話管道也建立了；但是，雖然兩岸和解在國際間受到肯定，在台灣內部仍有很深的焦慮以及不確定性。人民擔心，政府傾中的作法，是否真如馬總統的承諾，會帶來穩定與繁榮，還是會侵害台灣的主權、安全、民主以及經濟。

 

我並非來此解構馬總統對未來兩岸關係的計畫。但身為民進黨主席，我必須為民喉舌，說出人民的疑慮；身為與美國有共同戰略利益的朋友，民進黨也有責任，對當前可能影響台灣及區域前景的政策提出誠實及有建設性的評估。針對這個複雜的議題，已經舉辦了許多研討會和政策辯論；我可能無法在這次的演講中一一說明，我將從幾個關心的重點來討論，同時也提出我們對未來發展的看法。

 

Economics, trade and CECA/ECFA

經濟、貿易以及CECA/ECFA

 

先從經貿談起，這是目前在全球經濟危機下最為急迫的政策。自上任後，馬政府即將更緊密的兩岸關係奉為經濟政策的焦點，宣稱台灣經濟的前景要靠中國。在作法上，政府企圖與對岸簽訂如香港模式的『更緊密經濟伙伴安排』（CEPA），而其中CEPA第二條即明文寫著『一國兩制原則』。

 

馬政府稱做CECA或ECFA的這個安排，到底內容是什麼？上個月的民調資料顯示，有80%的民眾不瞭解這個安排的內容。經濟部長尹啟銘在四月時也承認經濟部尚未做好評估。在不透明、也沒有對大眾說明的情況下，我們很難評論這個架構。但是從台灣日漸依賴中國，使中國對台灣影響越大而產生的嚴重性來看，我們沒有選擇，只能提出一些原則和問題，希望在政府進行談判時能夠捍衛台灣的利益。

 

我們對ECFA的程序和內涵都有疑慮。一般各國的經驗是，不論有多強烈的政治善意或戰略意圖，在攸關經濟利益的關鍵問題上，貿易談判過程都會冗長煩人，也需徵詢公眾以及不同產業的意見。

 

但，和國際慣例相反，馬總統卻宣佈今年底和中國簽訂協議經濟是勢在必行，並將此視為振興台灣經濟的計畫，這種急就章的作法為台灣的談判方向帶來了許多疑點。

 

首先，這樣做的政治代價為何？香港的CEPA，也就是ECFA的參考模型，是在『一國兩制』這個大多數台灣人所反對的政治方案之前提下制訂的。目前政府尚未做出清楚堅定的承諾，將會在協議中排除任何政治妥協意涵的文字；馬總統對胡六點統一進程的正面回應，包含了一中架構，也挑起我們對檯面下是否已付出沈重政治代價的疑慮。

 

其次，透明度在哪裡？台灣人民以及民選的立法委員有權利知道、參與對其生活方式產生重大影響的協議制訂。我們要求政府在談判之前，必須就產業影響進行審慎評估，而相關訊息必須對立法部門以及民眾公布。過去幾個月來所簽訂的多項兩岸協議，在30天內即自動生效，社會大眾和立法院根本沒有機會檢視內容。不幸的是，馬總統拒絕了王金平院長在立法院內設立兩岸事務監督小組的建議。當面對赤裸裸展現旺盛企圖心的不友善國家時，民眾對政府的信心最能強化談判籌碼，而透明度和諮詢則是提升民眾信心的最好方式。

 

再則，在這項安排中，誰是贏家，誰是輸家？政府是否說了實話？我們的政府宣布了好消息，中國市場將為台灣產品開放。但，另一方面，有沒有壞消息？如果中國要求互惠，如同溫家寶總理最近在海南博鰲論壇所提，台灣市場也要對中國產品更加開放，這對台灣農業和製造業，有什麼立即的影響？在全球化及自由化的時代，政府無法永遠保護產業，但在眼前特別困難的時刻，我們的首要任務是促進就業。民進黨擔心，有些產業尚未準備好做調整，而在製造業則造成更多人失業。目前的失業率已創史上新高，此時若加快自由化的步伐，將會讓問題更加嚴重。

 

民進黨以及許多製造業和農業部門人員，要求對此進行更多的評估以及公共討論。要在今年的時程之內，讓社會對這項政策制訂過程有充分參與，顯然是來不及。

 

最後，如何能防範我們的經濟依賴受政治的操作？

兩岸經濟互動中，基本上的差異，在於台灣是個經濟和政治都開放的社會，而中國則是藉由國家資本主義及政治上不自由而展開經濟發展。開放社會在面對政治企圖及國家主導市場誘因時，該如何自保？這個問題很明顯。中國掌控觀光客和投資資本的時機以及數量，以造成短期繁榮幻覺，讓台灣同意其政治要求。中國阻撓台灣與其他主要經濟體簽訂自由貿易協定，也是其企圖陷縮台灣，讓台灣失去其他選擇，最後只能選擇中國的明顯表示。

 

在提出對當前經濟政策的反對看法時，必須先說明，我不反對自由化。台灣的經濟主要靠貿易和出口，而2001年加入WTO更是台灣納入全球貿易體系的里程碑。民進黨堅定支持台灣在WTO內扮演積極角色。在雙邊的層次上，關於與中國的貿易，在民進黨執政時主張積極開放，有效管理，以管理的方式逐步將兩岸經濟關係正常化。我們的作法讓台灣的公司能在中國成長中的市場以及投資機會中獲益，但同時也減低兩岸貿易自由化可能帶來的風險。我們開始協商及實行兩岸包機，也建立了中國觀光客來台灣的機制。同時，我們也在協商和開放的過程中，以進行詳細的產業評估和執行調整計畫，來確保台灣的主要經濟利益。為了彌補對中國過度依賴的風險，我們也積極地和其他主要或發展中經濟體建立更緊密的貿易關係，努力推動其他選擇，讓台灣企業能有多樣化的發展。

 

民進黨已利用各種可能的機會來提醒我們的政府，必須回應人民的焦慮，特別是在與中國進行快速經濟自由化時，可能會受到傷害的產業部門。很可惜，政府拒絕了監督機制以及信心建立，這些都加深了社會的對立，長遠而言，也不是維持繁榮的最好方法。我認為，真正雙贏的經濟關係協商，需要事前審慎評估、回應人民疑慮、確保工作機會，並讓產業部門也參與政策制訂過程，而不是事後通知。

 

Security and international relations

國家安全以及國際關係

 

我們要求與中國協商時必須更小心，因為中國對台灣的敵意尚未平息。在外交上，即使我們的政府以宣示『外交休兵』，中國仍無所不用其極地對台灣人民的國際參與設下重重藩籬。今年初，台灣女性在參加聯合國教科文組織所舉辦的婦女非政府組織會議時，即遭受甚於往年的嚴厲圍堵。幾天前，台灣在參加世界數位圖書館活動時，被拒於門外。

 

上個星期，政府收到以觀察員身份出席世界衛生大會的邀請。我們鼓勵衛生官員盡可能藉這個得來不易的機會，和世界各國衛生專家充分交流；但同時也要質疑，這個邀請是如何產生。這個邀請是在不知雙方何人、在何地進行的不透明談判下產生的。過去台灣人尋求國際支持以及多邊進行的方式推動參與，今年的邀請，我們擔心，是付出沈重的政治代價得來的。主要在於這種黑箱談判作業承認了中國『權利』，將決定台灣空間視為內部事務，排除了國際的影響。

 

中國也尚未放棄對台灣的安全威脅。馬英九還是總統候選人時，宣稱如果中國不將對準台灣的飛彈撤除，和平協議將無從討論。我們希望馬總統對說過的話負責，繼續要求中國馬上停止針對台灣的軍事部署。我們樂見馬英九在與華府的一場視訊會議上公開承諾，會持續民進黨政府時代將國防預算提高至GDP3%的作法。然而，事實上，國民黨政府今年卻削減了國防預算。

 

我們樂見兩岸和平，也希望減低緊張。這幾年來，我們也希望和對岸建立信心機制，以降低因意外及誤判而導致衝突的可能性。但是，長久的和平只能在我們處於有力的位置，擁有嚇阻中國威脅的能力時，才能維持。關於這一點，我要特別感謝歐巴馬政府延續支持台灣取得必要防禦性武器的政策。

 

在安全及國際關係領域中，我們和美國的關係特別重要。我們瞭解在民進黨政府後期，台美關係有段時間不太穩定。我們誠摯希望，能和華府重建信心，而共同戰略利益在我們持續就雙方歧異及顧慮進行對話時，將會出現。

 

我們從過去的教訓，瞭解到溝通和嚴謹的重要。來這裡要說美國朋友想聽的話，是很容易。身為為生存奮鬥的小國，台灣的利益和優先重點不見得與美國完全一致。不過，在一些領域我們有共同的想法，如台海和平與繁榮，促進貿易與交流，以及維護民主的香火等等。找出共同點，並加強我們在這些領域上的合作，非常重要。同時，我們要積極溝通，以避免在整合看法時產生歧異。

 

因此，只說我們不願成為麻煩製造者，是不夠的；如果我們只因有個世界強權指控台灣『找麻煩』，就停止捍衛自身的利益，隨著中國的情緒起伏，台灣將會更無助。與其他世界強權打交道時，小國領導人面臨的挑戰，是如何不喪失其自身立場與關鍵利益，同時建立共同戰略目標，並強化國家捍衛利益的力量。

 

在紀念台灣關係法三十週年的同時，我們也理解到，堅定的台美關係將是台海和平穩定、安全及繁榮的基石。我們無法承受和最重要盟邦在戰略目標上有誤解而造成的後果。

 

我們也以同樣的原則和日本等其他盟邦交往。我們特別擔心與日本關係的惡化。過去這一年來，由於對意外事件處理不當，造成了緊張。我們難以想像，台灣在東亞區域內最重要的盟邦，日本的大使，竟被執政黨列為不受歡迎人物。我們相信與日本的信心重建，不僅是雙邊關係的考量，也是為了更長遠的戰略利益。

 

這讓我們十分憂心。過去我們和美日的準同盟關係，在需要地緣政治均勢以維持台海穩定的狀況下，從來都沒問題。然而，目前的發展看來，在國民黨政府寄台灣前途於北京的新戰略觀，以及急於與中國整合的狀況下，馬英九顯然在與其他國際盟邦強化關係上著墨較少。除了宣稱自己不是麻煩製造者外，馬政府缺乏對美國的全面性政策；而和日本的緊張關係，更反映了其戰略的轉變以及基本方向的差異。當國民黨政府漸漸依賴中國作為通往世界的便道時，民進黨相信，我們必須恢復和盟邦關係的戰略平衡，直接與世界交往，而不是繞道北京。

 

Democracy and domestic politics

民主和國內政情

 

我們和美國的朋友們有一項戰略共同點，就是強化民主，如人權即是在台灣關係法內所強調的價值。過去數十年中，台灣在美國的祝福與支持下，於民主化有了重大的進展，這是我們十分驕傲的。在今天，民主以及愛好自由的人民，是台灣提昇國際能見度、對抗中國侵略不可或缺的力量。

 

不幸的是，在過去的一年中，民主發展的紀念碑蒙塵，而威權的標誌再度出現。在馬總統宣誓就職後的幾個月內，國民黨政府就把『台灣民主紀念館』改回『中正紀念堂』，紀念以戒嚴37年來統治台灣的獨裁者蔣氏父子。日前政府官員更宣布，要將民進黨時期在舊景美看守所設立的人權紀念園區改名，去掉『人權』。景美看守所過去是國民黨威權監禁政治良心犯的地方。最近，他們更企圖修改集會遊行法，讓警察有更高的權力決定抗議活動的申請及內容，限制了人民集會遊行的自由。而讓推動社會現代化的我們更驚訝的，是上個月馬總統竟然舉行了遙祭黃陵的儀式。

 

政府以上的作為並非僅是表徵或微不足道改變。他們更是在為台灣民主奉獻犧牲人士心中的傷口上灑鹽。

 

我們最擔心的是，政府和中國交往的過程中，台灣民主在中國的影響下更脆弱。然而，台灣並非特例，中國日益強大的經濟以及外交手段，讓全世界對其人權與自由的問題噤聲。但是對台灣來說，這個議題特別重要。民主是我們在兩岸關係中最重要的力量，我們無法忍受眼睜睜地看著政府企圖降低反對聲浪而侵蝕我們的自由，卻無所作為。這也是我們要在517走上街頭，並進行24小時的靜坐抗議，要求政府正視我們的態度和立場。

 

民主是民進黨創黨時的核心宗旨。一路走來，我們仍將不斷地捍衛民主和自由。我不願質疑馬總統『為全中國人民高舉自由的火把』的企圖，但我希望有一天，中國人民也能像台灣人一樣自由。然而，如果我們不努力鞏固民主制度，建立獨立司法，尊重對重要政策的監督機制，我們就無法開始影響中國民主化。

 

我們很失望，國民黨和政府十分努力地擁抱中國，但與民進黨和台灣人民的距離越來越遠。國民黨領導階層絡繹不絕地，急著到北京享受高規格的接待；而對台灣人民的質疑與顧慮卻視而不見。結果造成許多過去為台灣民主奮鬥的基層人士不是更激進就是失望冷漠。我認為，這無助於健全民主制度，人民不是更激進就是更冷漠的極端態度，也無助於建立台美共同期待的兩岸長期穩定關係。

 

The future of the DPP

民進黨的未來

 

去年當我剛接任民進黨黨主席時，這個黨歷經敗選，受傷慘重。帶領黨重新再起，是很艱鉅的挑戰。民進黨的理念價值，明訂於黨章之中，是以保障社會弱勢為原則，這也是民進黨八年執政之所以投注心力在建立社會安全網的原因；由此台灣人民得以在政治自由之外，更能有平等的教育、健康、以及經濟的機會。

 

民進黨員以及支持者對民進黨的期待，不僅在於打贏選戰。我們更以在任何政治風暴中都能確立黨的核心價值為任務目標。做為民主推動者以及台灣人民政經利益的捍衛者，民進黨要站穩腳跟；為了強化台灣民主，民進黨要堅強，這樣，台灣的民主才能在兩岸關係中，成為面對中國的有力槓桿。

 

為了強化我們的立場以及政策影響力，我們在內部已經成立了諮詢智庫，由民進黨執政時期的政務官們，提供政策規劃以及行政的經驗。我們希望能擴大專業角色，發展民進黨進行深度政策對話的能力。我們也成立了中國事務工作小組，邀集前任官員以及新生代，共同討論對中國的策略，並對政府現行政策提出回應。我們理解到擴大支持基礎以及建立內部對中國政策共識的重要性，我們舉辦了兩次民間國事會議，做為整合市民社會、非政府組織、學術界以及其他政黨對台灣前途意見之平台。

 

兩岸發展對台灣未來經濟競爭力以及政治生存影響深遠。風險很高，所以我們必須持續關注接下來的發展。在國內，我們將邀集各產業，努力擴大基層支持，要求政府在與中國進一步協商時，必須提高透明度、敏感度，並適時回應民眾。在國際上，我們要持續要求國際社會，特別是在美國的朋友們，支持台灣民主、確保台灣國際空間以及安全。

 

 

Approaches to Cross-Strait Relations

 

Thank you, Dr. McCord, and the Taiwan Education and Research Program of George Washington University for hosting this event and giving me the opportunity to share some thoughts about political developments in Taiwan and cross-strait relations. The cross-strait relationship is not only one of the most important public policy issues in Taiwan, manifested in the security, economic and political realms. The relationship is also an issue relevant to US interests and concerns in the region.

 

Cross-strait relations have taken a dramatic turn since the change of government in Taiwan last year. Mainly, President Ma has been engaging in rapid rapprochement with China, not only signifying the end of hostilities between two historically opposing political parties, the KMT and the CCP, but also bringing the two governments that the parties lead closer than ever.

 

At first glance, detente and embraces would have one believe that all is well and merry across the Strait. Indeed, tensions are reduced and communication channels have been resumed. However, although the cross-strait rapprochement has been welcomed by certain members of the international community, including the United States government, there remains a deep sense of anxiety and uncertainty within Taiwan as to whether the manner in which this government is getting closer to China will bring about sustained stability and prosperity, as President Ma has promised, or an erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty, security, democracy and economic leverage.

 

I did not come here with the purpose of deconstructing the rosy picture President Ma has painted for the future of cross-strait relations. However, as leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, it is my duty to express the concerns of many Taiwanese people. As friends of the United States who share common strategic interests, the DPP also believes it is our responsibility to provide an honest and constructive assessment of how current policies might affect the future of Taiwan and the region. This is a complicated issue over which numerous conferences and policy debates have been conducted, and although I may not be able to cover all the complexities in this presentation, I will try to lay out the key areas of our concerns as well as our views on moving ahead.

 

 

Economics, trade and CECA/ECFA

 

Let me begin by talking about the area of economics and trade, a public policy matter of particular urgency in this time of global crisis. Since assuming office, the Ma government has made closer cross-strait ties the centerpiece of its economic policy, arguing that Taiwan’s economic future lies in China. At the core of this approach is the intention to sign an economic framework agreement modeled after Hong Kong’s CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement), in which Article 2 clearly states the principle of “one country, two systems.”

 

What is the content of this arrangement, which the Ma government is calling CECA or ECFA? A poll conducted last month shows that 80% of Taiwan’s citizens do not know what this arrangement is. Economics Minister Yin also admitted in April that the ministry had not yet completed its analysis on the project. It is difficult to critique a framework that is opaque and not explained to the public. However, given the gravity of the economic leverage that China has already accumulated over Taiwan’s reliance, we have no choice but to present a number of principles and questions in hopes that Taiwan’s interests are defended as the government proceeds in the negotiations.

 

Our concerns about ECFA are both procedural and substantive. As a general practice around the world, no matter how much political goodwill or strategic impetus is in place, when major economic interests are at stake, trade negotiations tend to be a long and tedious process, involving consultations with the public and various industrial sectors.

 

However, contrary to practice, President Ma has announced the intention to sign the agreement with China by the end of this year as part of his economic revitalization plan, and the urgency of his appeal leads us to a number of questions and worries about Taiwan’s negotiating leverage:

 

First, what is the political price? The Hong Kong CEPA, after which ECFA is modeled, is premised on the “one country, two systems” formula, which the vast majority of Taiwanese people oppose as a political formula for Taiwan. The government has yet to make a clear and unwavering pledge that will rule out such politically compromising language from the agreement. President Ma’s positive response to Hu’s “six point” roadmap for unification and the “one China” framework has only provoked our concern that a heavy political price has been paid under the table.

 

Second, where is the transparency? The people of Taiwan and their elected legislators have the right to be informed and to take part in any agreement that will have a major impact on their way of life. We have demanded that prior to the negotiations, the government must conduct careful assessment by industry and sector, and the information should be made available to the legislature and the public. The previous cross-strait agreements made over the past few months took effect automatically within 30 days upon signing, without giving the legislature or the public a chance for review. Unfortunately, President Ma also rejected parliamentary speaker Wang Jin-ping’s proposal of establishing a “Cross-strait affairs supervisory working group” （兩岸事務監督小組）in the legislature. When facing a hostile country with such outright aggressive intentions, public confidence in the government is paramount to strengthening our negotiating leverage, and there is no better way to boost public confidence than transparency and consultation.

 

Third, who are the winners and losers in this arrangement and is the government telling us the truth? Our government tells us the good news: that the agreement will open the Chinese market for Taiwanese products. What about the other side of the story, or the bad news? When China starts making reciprocal demands, as Premier Wen Jiabao did recently at the Boao Forum in Hainan, of opening Taiwan further to Chinese products, what is the immediate impact on Taiwan’s agricultural and manufacturing sector? In an era of globalization and liberalization, the government cannot be protective forever, but in the current period of hardship, our top priority is in job creation. The DPP is concerned, just as you are in the United States, that some of our industries are not fully prepared for the adjustment and more manufacturing jobs will be lost. Our unemployment rate is at a record high at the moment, and increasing the pace of liberalization at this particular time may magnify the problem.

 

My party, along with representatives of various manufacturing and agricultural sectors, has demanded more thorough assessment and public discourse. And the timeframe of this year is certainly not enough for engaging our society in the policy process.

 

Fourth, what are the safeguards against political manipulation of our economic dependence? A fundamental discrepancy in cross-strait economic interaction is the fact that Taiwan is an economically AND politically open society, while our counterpart China is economically moving towards state-sanctioned capitalism and politically illiberal. How does an open society guard against politically motivated and state-orchestrated market incentives? Indicators of this problem are quite obvious. China carefully manages both timing and quantity of tourists and capital investment, to create illusions of short-term prosperity concurring with their political needs in Taiwan. China’s blockade of Taiwan’s efforts to sign FTA’s with other major economies is also an obvious indication of their intention to tighten the noose around Taiwan, leaving Taiwan with no other option but China.

 

While voicing our objections to the current economic approach, I want to be clear that we are not opposed to trade liberalization per se. Taiwan’s economy is highly reliant on trade and exports, and our accession to the WTO in 2001 is an important milestone in incorporating Taiwan into the global trade regime. The DPP is fully committed to supporting our country’s active role in the WTO. On a bilateral level, in terms of trade with China, while the DPP was in government, we pursued a policy of active opening and effective management, gradually normalizing the economic relationship in a managed way. Our approach allowed Taiwanese companies to take advantage of the growing market and investment opportunities China had to offer while at the same time reduced the potential risks of cross-strait trade liberalization. We began to negotiate and implement cross-strait charter flights, and we established a mechanism which initiated the visits of Chinese tourists to Taiwan. At the same time, however, we tried to safeguard Taiwan’s core economic interests by conducting detailed industry assessments and implementing adjustment plans in the process of negotiating and opening up. To offset the risk of over-dependence on China, we also actively pursued closer trade ties with other major and developing economies, trying to promote alternatives that would provide diversification incentives to Taiwanese businesses.

 

The DPP has been using every opportunity possible to remind our government of the need to respond to the anxieties of the people, especially those of industrial sectors that would be hurt by rapid liberalization with China. Unfortunately, the government’s rejection of mechanisms that would enhance institutional checks and consensus building, have intensified the divisions in our society, which in the long run would not be the best formula for sustainable prosperity. In my view, a truly win-win economic relationship should be one that is negotiated with calculated prudence, responds to the anxieties of the people, assures job opportunities, and involves dialogue with industrial sectors in the process of policy-making – not afterwards.

 

Security and international relations

 

We urge greater caution in negotiating with China in light of the fact that China’s ill intensions toward Taiwan have not subsided. On the diplomatic front, despite our government’s call for a “diplomatic truce,” China continues to impose obstacles to the international participation of Taiwanese people wherever possible. Earlier this year, Taiwanese women faced an even harsher blockade than previous years in trying to participate in the ECOSOC women’s NGO conference. Days ago, Taiwanese were also barred form attending activities of the World Digital Library.

 

Last week our government received an invitation to observe the World Health Assembly. While we would encourage our health officials to maximize this hard-earned opportunity to engage with the international network of health experts, at the same time we do have some reservations about how this invitation came about. It was negotiated in a very opaque manner, between unknown individuals from both sides at un unknown place. Contrary to the practice of previous years, where the Taiwanese people sought the support of international friends in a multi-lateral process, this year’s invitation, we fear, comes at great political expense. Mainly, the black-box negotiating process assumes China’s “right,” as an internal decision, as opposed to an international matter, over Taiwan’s space. The one-time invitation also gives China ongoing leverage in the coming years to extract concessions from us for their “permission.”

 

Neither has the security threat against Taiwan subsided. Ma as candidate during his presidential campaign had announced that as long as the Chinese do not remove the missiles threatening Taiwan, there will be no discussion of a peace agreement. We hold Ma accountable to his words and continue to demand that China stops immediately its hostile deployment against Taiwan. We welcome President Ma’s public commitment, made during his recent video conference with Washington, to continue the DPP administration’s goal of spending 3% of our GDP on defense. However, in reality the administration has cut defense spending for this year.

 

We welcome peace across the Taiwan Strait and we welcome the reduction of tensions. For many years, we have also been willing to establish Confidence Building Measures across the strait so as to reduce the possibility of conflict arising from accidents and miscalculations. However, sustainable peace can only be maintained if we stand from a position of strength, having the capacity to deter threats coming from China. On this point I want to express appreciation to the Obama administration for continuing the policy of supplying Taiwan with the necessary arms for our self-defense.

 

In the realm of security and international relations, our ties with the United States are particularly important. We recognize that toward the end of the DPP administration there was a bumpy period in our relations with the Untied States. We genuinely hope that confidence can be restored with Washington, and that a strategic convergence of interests will emerge while we continue to communicate our differences and concerns.

 

One lesson we have learned is the importance of communication and prudence. It is relatively easy to come here and say what our American friends want to hear. As a small country struggling for survival, however, our interests and priorities are not entirely identical to those of the United States. Yes, there are many areas of convergence, in the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, in enhancing trade and exchanges, and in the survival of our democracy, among them. It is important to identify the areas of convergence and strengthen our cooperation in those areas. At the same time, however, we must find ways to communicate our concerns so as to prevent potential differences from coming in the way of our convergences.

 

Therefore it is not enough to say that we do not want to be trouble-makers, for once we stop defending our interests when a world power finds us “troublesome,” we will put ourselves in a position ever more vulnerable to the whims of Chinese pleasure or, for that matter, displeasure. The challenge for the leadership of a small country in engaging with other world powers, is how not to forfeit our own priorities but to build upon the strategic convergence that would give strength in defending our own interests.

 

As we commemorate the 30^th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, we also recognize that the strong Taiwan-US relationship has been the cornerstone of peace, stability, security and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot afford to have misunderstandings with our most important friend and ally regarding our strategic goals.

 

The same principle applies to our engagement with other friends such as Japan. We are extremely concerned about the deteriorating relationship with Japan. The mismanagement of incidents have boiled over into crises a number of times during the past year. It is unimaginable to us that the ambassador of Japan, one of Taiwan’s most important partners in the region, would be labeled a persona non-grata by the governing party. We believe that the restoration of confidence with Japan is not only a matter of bilateral concern but of our broader strategic interest.

 

This worries us tremendously. In the past, our quasi-alliance with the US and Japan was never a matter of doubt, for the stability across the Taiwan Strait required this geopolitical balance. However, what we see evolving at the moment in our government is a new strategic approach that stakes Taiwan’s future in Beijing. In all his eagerness to integrate with China, Ma has done less to strengthen our ties with other partners. The absence of a broader policy toward the US beyond the declaration that “I am not a trouble-maker,“ and the existence of tensions with Japan reflect this strategic shift and a fundamental difference in approach. While our government is increasingly relying on China as its gateway to the world, the DPP believes in the need to restore the strategic balance in our relations, engaging directly with the rest of the world instead of via Beijing.

 

Democracy and domestic politics

 

One area of strategic convergence with our friends in the United States is the strengthening of our democracy, which along with human rights is one of the values highlighted in the Taiwan Relations Act. We are proud to say that the people of Taiwan have, over the decades and with the blessing and support of our American friends, made tremendous progress in democratization. Today democracy, and the people that make up our free society, are Taiwan’s essential assets when it comes to promoting our international participation and confronting China’s encroachments.

 

Unfortunately over the past year symbols of the authoritarian past have been revived, while monuments commemorating our progress toward democracy are reduced. Within months of President Ma’s inauguration, his government changed the “Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall” back to the “Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall,” commemorating the dictator and his son who together ruled Taiwan through 37 years of Martial Law. Recently officials announced plans to eliminate the words “Human Rights” from the memorial park that the DPP government converted from the former Ching-mei Detention Center (景美看守所), where the former prisoners of conscience were incarcerated. Recently, the KMT made an attempt to revise the “Assembly and Parade Act” （集會遊行法） restricting the freedom of the people to assemble and demonstrate by giving the police greater authority to determine the nature, manner, and content of demonstrations permitted. What is also mind-boggling to those of us who want to move our society forward in a modern age, is that President Ma launched an official state offering ceremony to the yellow Emperor of China just last month.

 

The above steps are not just mere symbols or minor changes. They are direct assaults on the wounds of the many freedoms fighters who have made tremendous sacrifices in bringing about democracy and progress to Taiwan.

 

Our greatest worry is that in the process of engaging with China, Taiwan’s democracy is actually becoming more vulnerable to Chinese influence. This is not a problem unique to Taiwan, for Chinese growing economic and diplomatic leverage is silencing support for its human rights and freedom from all over the world. But for Taiwan, the issue is particularly critical. Democracy for us is the most important leverage in cross-strait relations, and we cannot afford to sit back and watch the gradual erosion of our liberties as the state tries to mute opposing voices. That is why on May 17 we plan to hold a large rally, followed by a 24-hour sit-in, to voice our positions in a way that can no longer be ignored by the government.

 

Democracy is one of the core founding values of the DPP. We will continue to protect and defend our democracy and liberty, as we have done in the past. I do not want to dispute President Ma’s ambition of “bearing the torch of democracy for all Chinese people,” and I genuinely hope that some day the people of China may also enjoy the same freedoms that we have in Taiwan. However, if we do not work on consolidating our own democratic institutions, preserving the impartiality of the judiciary, respecting a system of checks and balances over major public policy, then we will not be strong enough to even begin to have an impact on the democratization of China.

 

It saddens us that the KMT party and the government have invested more efforts in embracing China than communicating with the DPP and the Taiwanese people. One after another, the KMT leadership has rushed to the red carpets and banquet halls in Beijing while ignoring our questions and concerns. As a result, many of the grassroots foot soldiers who had fought the battles bringing about democratization in Taiwan have either radicalized or turned hopelessly apathetic. This, in my view, is not conducive to a healthy democracy, and neither will such radicalization and apathy provide the long-term stability that both Taiwan and the US seek to achieve in cross-strait relations.

 

The future of the DPP

 

When I assumed the leadership of the DPP nearly one year ago, the party was defeated, divided and wounded. Challenges have been immense as I proceed to lead the party on the path of recuperation. A core spirit of the DPP, illustrated in our party charter, is the principle of defending the weak and disadvantaged sectors of our society. That is why during our eight years in government we invested tremendous energy in establishing a basic social safety net for our people, so that the people of Taiwan may enjoy not only political freedoms but also equal access to education, healthcare and economic opportunities.

 

Our party members and our supporters expect the DPP to do more than win elections. We are also tasked with the mission of ensuring that the core values of our party will survive all kinds of political turmoil, and that the DPP will stand strong as a promoter of democracy and guardian of the political and economic interests of the Taiwanese people. The DPP must be strong for Taiwan’s democracy to be strong, and Taiwan’s democracy must be strong to have the leverage to face China in cross-strait relations.

 

To strengthen our position and policy influence, internally we have established an advisory think tank made up of former officials of the DPP administration, who have accumulated much experience in policy planning and implementation. We hope to maximize the expertise to develop our party’s capacity for in-depth intellectual policy discourse. We have also established a China Affairs Working Group, which incorporates former officials as well as the younger generation, in charting our strategies toward China and responses toward government policy. Recognizing the importance of broadening our base and building domestic consensus on China policy, externally we have held two citizens’ conferences on national affairs, as a platform for incorporating the views of the civil society, NGO’s, academics and other political parties in our discussion about Taiwan’s future.

 

Cross-strait developments have a vital effect on Taiwan’s future economic competitiveness and political survival. The stakes are high and we have no choice but to remain vigilant about where things are going. On a domestic level, we will try to broaden our grassroots organizational base by joining forces with industry sectors, in order to demand greater transparency, sensitivity and responsiveness from our government as they move forward with their negotiations with China. On an international level, we will continue to appeal to the international community, especially our friends in the United States, to support Taiwan’s democracy, international space and security.

 

I understand that many of you are involved in the Taiwan Education and Research Program here at GWU and may already be experts on this topic. Therefore while I am open to your questions, I also welcome your comments and thoughts.