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主席出訪美加 談話參考資料

LI執委會5月2日9-11am “International Political Panel”場

講題：”Liberal Tasks: A Political Agenda for 2010-2020”

這是我的榮幸，能夠參與今天的盛會。特別是雖然台灣的民主進步黨這幾年來已是國際自由聯盟中的活躍會員，而我對LI來說，卻是新人。自從去年接任黨主席以來，我一直望有機會能參加這個全世界民主自由政黨領導人的聚會。我的同仁告訴我，這些年來，LI是如何堅定地支持台灣的民主，對於身為這個陣線其中一員的民進黨來說，我們感到十分驕傲。

我特別感謝能夠有這個機會來向同為政治領導人的各位貴賓談話。去年民進黨在立法委員及總統兩項大選中失利後，黨員們選擇我為新的黨主席。我相信，因為他們理解到民進黨需要改變，需要新想法和新作為，才能有新氣象。有些價值和國際自由聯盟的成立宗旨是相符的，因此，我們得以有這個討論、激盪這些新想法的平台，而最好的政治實踐成果也能在此檢討和分享。

大會希望我來談談未來十年自由主義者的政治目標。為了放眼未來，我們必須檢視目前的問題以及趨勢。經濟危機的發生，讓我們反省，過去數十年的自由市場運作模式出了什麼問題。全球化增加了機會但也製造了問題。我們大多同意市場企業增進了人類的福祉；然而，現有的全球化市場機制卻無法解決，甚至是讓一些如污染、貪污、疾病、開發以及貧窮等問題更加惡化。

身為自由主義者，我們提倡市場全球化的價值，同時我們也要負起責任，著手處理這個制度為政治、社會及經濟所帶來的問題。我們相信這些問題不是理想狀態下的自由市場經濟應該會造成的結果，但除非我們能夠回應這些因不理想的全球市場經濟所造成的問題，否則我們無法說服更多社會大眾。

例如，不負責任的銀行體系以及金融運作造成的問題，擴大到全球，是眼下的危機。這種不負責的做法，造成了對減少管制以及自由化的極度不信任。我認為這種現象在未來十年仍會持續。嚴重的失業，對貧窮社群的打擊最大，也造成社會不滿。而對自然資源的過度開發，特別是消耗能量最多的幾個國家的作為，當地人民僅得微薄利潤，卻得忍受所留下的環境破壞；這些都帶來傷害，也有違公平。

我在此強調，在邁向未來十年之時，我們必須在社會政治面做到更公平、更透明，才能強化大眾對市場全球化的信心。身為自由主義者，我對私部門以及國際網絡在這個過程中所能做的，特別有興味。

我非常欣賞以鼓勵小型私人企業來減緩貧窮的商業模式，如諾貝爾獎得主Mohammed Yunus所倡導的微型信貸計畫。這可以創造機會，也讓弱勢者能夠集資，鼓勵創業以及過程中的會計責任。

在大方向上，我們所面臨的一個重要政治目標，是強化透明及責任的機制，不論是在公共支出方面還私人企業方面。如同民主政治中的政黨競爭，監督是重要的；但在國際的層次上，則必須檢視各個面向，並了解其未來十年的發展。

不論是在貿易、安全，或是政治行動上，世界貿易組織(WTO)多哈回合談判的破裂以及美國在外交及安全的單邊政策在過去十年都造成其他主要經濟體與國際要角更加依賴區域主義及雙邊主義。理想中區域主義應該不違背國際主義；區域主義應對促進鄰近或相似社會之間的整合，為面對全球化的更多挑戰層面做好準備。歐洲整合是一個好的例子，過程中包含了程序透明以及民主原則；市場途徑和投資刺激了政治改革。

但是，在世界其他地方，除了看著社會對世界開放，我們也目睹區域主義為不自由的政治因素所控制。不僅未建立全球整合的平台，區域成員卻藉由排外以及政治控制的方式來處理。例如在拉丁美洲，部份區域領袖藉由區域網絡和提供援助，以及利用天然資源進行短期經濟刺激，更強以非自由的思維對國家進行政經控制。

雙邊以及區域性的安排，整合了部分國際多邊架構外的市場。而代償效應將降低全球機制設立在前的標準與規則。例如，東協(ASEAN)的設立，整體來說可能對會員國的經濟發展有所幫助；但確定的是，東協對推動政治改革與社會進步，效益較低。這幾年來，東協有不干涉內政的政策，規避了會員國內政治變革以及人權的議題。明年即將展開的東協加一(中國)將進一步強化市場整合，但同時也提供中國更多掌控區域的權力。

這就是區域主義的風險，當雙邊或區域市場運作過程為一群政治上非自由也不民主的要角，對短期利益的追求，將會阻礙民主制度建立以及政治自由化這些需要長期建構的機制。

要在貿易協議上包含及結合所有政治和社會標準的面向是不可能的，也是不可能達成的目標。然而，身為自由主義者，我們必須了解所謂貿易安排的危險性，因為這些安排，實際上對其他成員是具排他性、不相容性的。這種安排會沖淡國際制度的重要性以及要求行為的標準。如果市場整合缺乏民主、透明以及對環境的考量等基本標準，長期下來，不滿情緒將會高漲。

因此，我相信自由主義者必須呼籲，在此邁入下個十年之際，我們要在多邊全球及區域組織中，建立自由政治之原則，除此才能為即將面臨的挑戰找到解決之道。

在討論為未來十年的政治目標時，無可避免地必須探討中國的崛起。身為在東亞打造成功民主轉型之政黨的領導人，我是特別適合探討這個議題的人選。或許有人會認為我有偏見，因為我來自台灣，也就是全世界承受中國崛起壓力最前線的國家。但我認為台灣今天所面臨的，將是未來世界其他國家未來所面臨的；而在這個過程中，政治目標將如蜘蛛網般複雜，等待我們去解決。

中國正在崛起中，這是無庸置疑。中國很大，人口眾多，的確會認為自己不該僅是個區域成員，而且他的崛起也遲了很久才開始。中國領導階層做了許多關於強權起落的研究，以圖表分析其發展路徑，並在過程中發展全球討論。他們了解世界強權的興衰，在歷史上，通常是需要付出例如戰爭這種重大的代價。要減輕全球對這種干擾世界秩序行動的疑慮，中國謹慎地打造了以「和平崛起」、「和平發展」的字眼進行國際宣傳。

然而，中國的崛起真的和平嗎？中國的崛起在世界各地造成了什麼影響？在我們自由主義者能夠影響的空間內，還有什麼變數？未來十年是危機關鍵，讓我們從軍事及安全、環境、經濟發展以及政治等幾個方面來檢視

上星期中國人民解放軍在青島港以海上閱兵方式慶祝海軍建軍60週年。位於瑞典斯德哥爾摩和平研究所季北慈認為這是中國海軍即將擴大活動範圍的警示。而日前隱而未現的核子潛艇以及其他艦艇的演習等則點出了中國從大陸強權轉型成為海洋強權。

中國捍衛其藍水海軍的發展以及海岸線以外的軍事能力，是為了確保中國的國際經濟利益。然而，中國在2005年通過了所謂的反分裂法，成為中國單方面認為領土受到威脅時得以出兵的法源。這是中國海上作戰正當化的前序，無關中國船隻的航行安全。目前中國和印度、越南、菲律賓、日本以及台灣，都有領土爭議。去年一份美國國會研究報告中提出警告，中國的戰略目標之一，可能在於解除美國在這個區域的軍事影響，以及拒絕美國進入特定海域。數個月前美國籍船隻所受到的騷擾，以英國金融時報的說法，是事態即將發生。美日兩國都對中國的軍事支出不透明表達了疑慮。

美國人也許還沒準備好接受美國相對失勢，以及地緣政治從單邊到多極中心之軍事控制的重新定義。軍事專家也提到，中國需要10年以上的時間才能有美國目前軍事實力的水平。但是，全球安全受到無預警的威脅，美國軍隊在伊拉克以及阿富汗的過度延伸，在在都打擊了美國對其他區域的影響程度；中國則十分積極地擠身進入這權力真空，從東南亞、非洲到拉丁美洲，處處散佈其影響力。

甚至那些在冷戰結束後質疑美國霸權傾向的人也要問，未來十年如果含括俄國和中國於新的權力均勢中，世界是否能夠趨於穩定；即使樂觀的人都認為，挑戰歷史中強權興衰的模式是有可能的，這有助中國以和平的方式崛起；但都不能忽略，在眼前的各種國際間關係中，民主是最不具敵意的。很顯然，中國並不是民主國家，而對未來可能的衝突，世人有更多的疑慮。

在談論中國軍事影響升高以及其在未來關鍵十年對全球局勢穩定所可能造成的衝擊，我認為自由主義者的目標是：第一，呼籲從歐盟繼續禁止對中國的武器輸出；第二，持續要求中國在進行軍事現代化時，有更高的透明度；第三，提醒中國，作為國際社會的利害關係者，必須負起維持和平與穩定的責任。我們必須不斷地要求中國放棄以武力威脅解決紛爭。

現在來談中國崛起的經濟面向。中國自1980年代施行「有中國特色的社會主義」，也就是以國家為導向的經濟開放及自由化。我不認為有任何人會反對這個自由開放的策略對中國帶來了好處。甚至在目前的經濟風暴中，中國仍維持8%的年經濟成長率。至於其他的自由經濟體，包括政治上處於對立的我們，都多少在中國自由化的過程中獲益。

然而，中國的經濟發展已讓環境付出重大代價，而影響之大，甚至超出亞洲大陸的範圍。過去二十年中國達成了西方國家一世紀才完成的發展目標，而中國官員承認，他們也面臨20年即造成一世紀的污染問題。中國目前是世界最大的煤、石油、鋼鐵的消費者，也是最大的二氧化碳排放國。

為了滿足能源的需要，中國急速地在人口密集的東南沿岸建立核能發電廠。在此不需提醒各位，在俄國、美國、日本等有核能源經驗專家的國家，都曾有意外的慘痛教訓。在中國，核電廠中的任何管理不當或意外，都會造成人類和環境的大災難。

我們不能忽略環境社會學家的論點，認為中國的污染和環境問題是已開發國家將高污染工業轉移到低開發國家的環境殖民主義之結果。但是，中國和其他國家都不應藉口利益導向之經濟發展策略，而規避改善環境問題的責任。對全球自由主義者而言，我們特別要維持高道德標準，要求政府以及私部門在與中國進行經濟交往時，將環境面向列入考量，發展高效能源科技，以及再生能源。

第二個關於中國經濟成長的面向，我希望大家注意中國將發展模式外銷到其他開發中國家的問題。藉著外援以及目標性的投資策略，中國的觸角各處延伸：菲律賓和瓜地馬拉的電訊通訊業，哥倫比亞的煤礦，撒哈拉沙漠的煉油廠，還有許多部門分布在在座各位的國家內。有些投資是藉由中國日漸茁壯的私人企業發展而成的跨國公司進行，但大部分則是由政府主導，同時也是策略性的目標。

中國的經濟力以及國際能見度已經對開發中國家在計畫發展策略時造成影響，我們了解許多開發中社會的政治辯論將集中在華府共識及北京共識之間的分歧，即使他們不見得沿用這些字眼。

不論各位是否同意這樣的字語(我發現在G-20峰會後，英國首相布朗宣示華盛頓共識已然結束)，但華盛頓共識的特質，如金融原則，減少管制，貿易自由化，國營企業民營化，以及修改對有利發展之基礎工作的無差別補助，例如教育等。這些都和自由主義的價值相通。但是，如同我之前所提過，我們在解決貧窮、開發以及貪污等問題上的失敗，除了布朗首相，更會讓其他開發中國家質疑，我們的方案是否是最好的。

這也是北京共識得以出線的機會，它提供了另一種發展的模式。這不是冷戰思維下的由意識形態所劃分的集團對抗，各國審慎評估眼前各種發展選擇，也有可能接受一個綜合各家的模型。當北京共識吸收了一些市場特質，且不排除演化和創造性時，會更強調物質的發展，凌駕於政治自由之上。這也認可了會計主權的獨立，也就是說，在面對改革的壓力時，透明度即會消失

北京發展模式是新加坡也可能會傳達的：政府的慈悲以及在缺乏政治自由和民主的情況下處理經濟發展，建立了信心的意識形態。在世界各地以搜購能源之作為和投資策略來誇耀經濟財富，將誤導許多政府步其後塵。中國的做法也削弱了石油輸出國家(OECD)在政治改革以及在提供外援上對會計透明的要求

在面對中國崛起最複雜的部分，就是政治和民主。中國民主化可能是這個世紀最重要的政治工作之一。雖然中國內部有許多爭取政治自由化的聲浪，目前在政府的控制下，是不可能達成的。中國崛起如果沒有民主，其軍事野心以及目前推行的這種經濟發展模式所帶來的後果，將會十分危險。如果中國是個民主國家，中國崛起的壓力以及對世界秩序的干擾，將會減緩許多。我們必須思考和討論的，是如何影響中國的政治自由化。

許多人認為應該與中國交往，我也同意，因為我們都對中國的改變有責任，我們必須和中國交流，並影響他的改變。然而，我憂心交往的過程中，在短期的利益以及誘人的市場刺激下，會讓我們從大局中轉向，而讓我們在面對缺乏透明度、責任制度、基本自由以及人權的中國時，遇到很大的困難。

在未來十年，我們面對的，是更有信心的中國，他將更靈活地運用柔性國力以及經濟手段來達成政治目的。我們台灣人有痛苦的經驗，和中國談判時，如果在基本原則上妥協，只會讓中國軟土深掘，要求更多。目前各國不但沒有要求中國改變、自由化，各政府領袖及政策制定者都對重要的人權議題保持沉默。市場通路是最常被用在政治手段的，如果大家都屈服於這種壓力，把注意力從政治問題移開，各位也就失去了改變的機會。雖然得到了短期利益，就長期而言，這是助紂為虐，你們是幫助中國這個一黨專政國家干涉市場運作。不僅看不到更強的市場原則在經濟自由的中國成長，也把政治自由的議題在與中國交往的過程中，丟到一邊，這只讓政治操作、貪污、國家管控市場企業的情形更加嚴重

在台灣，雖然我們和中國有特別的議題；我不認為在未來十年內，台灣還是唯一被中國影響內政的國家。為了摧毀政治的差異，進一步公開軍事威脅，中國已經使用複雜的手段分化征服，利用商業利益以及對媒體的滲透來影響台灣內部的民主進程。作為背負威權統治歷史，持續轉型正義的新興民主國家，台灣在面對這些壓力時，是很脆弱的。藉由高傲地允諾短期利益，中國成功地弱化了台灣部分政客對民主原則的堅持。

下個月將是六四天安門事件二十週年。中國至今尚未對這個國家暴力造成的悲劇有過任何道歉。現在仍然有記者、學者以及社運人士等人在支持08憲章後下落不明。我們必須時時提醒自己這些存在的事實，即使是在G-20國家歡迎也期待中國成為世界經濟的救世者時。

我們正在不確定年代中的十字路口上，面臨嚴重金融風暴打擊以及地緣戰略重整的挑戰。但危機也是轉機，以上就整體的情勢談了面對不完美市場經濟時，加強多邊機制以解決問題的看法；另外特別提到中國的崛起，並不僅是警示，也是希望身為堅定自由主義者的各位能夠傳布市場自由主義的想法。如果有人能夠影響中國演進和崛起方式的，中國和全球價值整合，這將是中國內外的自由主義者願意呼籲以及在行動上堅持政治自由化的結果。

面對未來十年的這些挑戰，我們必須團結合作。這也是我感到十分榮幸能在此和各位談論這個題目的原因。民進黨累積了許多與極權主義對抗的經驗，雖然目前暫時落敗，我們仍是很有希望贏回政權；我們承載了許多台灣人的期待，我們也希望，有著各位的支持與祝福，我們將再起，與各位共同推動基本自由與政治自由到世界上包括中國在內的更多地方。

”Liberal Tasks: A Political Agenda for 2010-2020”

Thank you, the Honorable Hans Van Baalen (Deputy President of Liberal International), ladies and gentlemen, friends of the liberal family,

It is my pleasure to be here at the Liberal International Executive Committee, especially since although the party that I lead, the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan, has been an active member of Liberal International for many years, personally I am a newcomer to this organization. Since assuming leadership of the party last year, I have been looking for the opportunity to meet you, leaders of other liberal and democratic political parties from around the world. My colleagues have told me how Liberal International has been steadfast and unwavering in supporting Taiwan’s democratization over the years, and the DPP has been a proud member of this network.

I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to address this distinguished audience of political leaders. Last May, following my party’s defeat in the legislative and presidential elections, fellow party members elected me as their leader, I believe, because they recognized a need for change, for new ideas and new ways of getting things done. Part of the value of having this network of liberal parties is so that we may have a platform for discussing and stimulating those new ideas, and that best practices for politics can be examined and shared.

I was asked to speak on liberal tasks for a political agenda in the next decade. And in order to look ahead, we must also examine some of the problems and trends that exist. The current economic crisis leads us to rethink what has gone wrong in the way free markets have functioned over the past decade. Globalization multiplies opportunities but magnifies problems at the same time. I think most of us can agree that the market enterprise has improved the standard of living of unprecedented numbers of people. However, the global market system that we have now has not resolved, and in certain cases, even exacerbated problems of pollution, corruption, disease, exploitation and poverty.

As liberals who promote the value of market globalization, we must also shoulder the responsibility of tackling the political, social and economic ills that have been on the rise under the current system. Needless to say, we believe that these ills are not a necessary consequence of liberal market economics in its ideal form. But we will not be able to convince the broader society unless we can build the capacity to respond to the problems that arise from a less-than ideal global market economy.

For example, we are currently suffering the consequence of irresponsible banking institutions and financial practices that have been magnified on a global level. Such irresponsibility has generated an unprecedented level of mistrust over deregulation and liberalization, which I expect will extend into the next decade. The massive unemployment, hitting hardest among poor communities, is also exacerbating discontent. Furthermore, the exploitation of natural resources, particularly by the largest energy consuming nations, in a way where profits are less than trickling down to people whose lives are affected by environmental degradation, is creating grave suffering and injustice.

There will be a session later today, the report by Vice President Juli Minoves, to address and debate the economics of the current global crisis. So I will not elaborate on the economic and financial side of our current challenges. However, I want to emphasize that as we proceed into the next decade, we must recognize that public confidence in market globalization can only be strengthened if we directly confront the need for greater fairness and transparency on the socio-political side. And as a liberal, I am particularly interested in what the private sector and international networks can do in the process.

I have been particularly fascinated by business models that encourage small-scale private enterprise as a solution to alleviating poverty, such as the micro-crediting programs initiated by Nobel Laureated Mohammed Yunus. It makes opportunities and capital accessible to the politically marginalized and socially disenfranchised sectors of society, encouraging entrepreneurship and accountability in the process.

On a larger scale, an important political task that we face is to strengthen the infrastructure for transparency and responsibility, both in public spending and in private enterprise. The checks and balances that we provide as competitive political parties in democracies are important, but on an international level we must look into institutions and how they might evolve over the next decade.

Whether it is in trade, security, or political initiatives, the breakdown of the Doha negotiations in the WTO and unilateral inclinations of US foreign and security policy over this past decade have compelled other major economies and international players to become more reliant on regionalism and bilateralism. Ideally regionalism should not be contradictory to internationalism. It should help to facilitate the integration of neighboring and familiar societies, preparing them, in some cases, for more challenging dimensions of globalization. The process of European integration is a positive example, for it incorporates procedural transparency and democratic principles. Market access and investment have become important incentives for political reform.

However, in other parts of the world, instead of seeing societies opening to the world, we are witnessing regionalism dominated by illiberal political influences. Instead of taking initiative to mold a platform for global integration, regional players are manipulating the regional process through exclusion and political dominance. In some cases such as in Latin America, some regional figures are also taking things further to impose illiberal ideas involving the political and economic dominance of the state, through regional networks and the offering of aid and short-term economic incentives in the form of natural resources.

Bilateral and regional arrangements integrate parts of markets outside of global multilateral frameworks. The replacement effect would diminish the standards and rules set forth by global mechanisms. For example, the formation of the regional block ASEAN, while arguably on the whole has helped to facilitate economic growth among members states, has been less effective in enabling political change and social progress. For years ASEAN had a policy of non-intervention, shying away from issues of political change and human rights within member states. The inauguration of the ASEAN plus China framework next year will further intensify market integration but at the same time provide China with greater leverage for regional dominance.

This is the risk of regionalism, that is, when you have a group of mostly politically illiberal and undemocratic players dominating a bilateral or regional market process, the pursuit of short-term profits will dampen the longer-term incentives of creating mechanisms to ensure democratic rules-based procedures and political liberalization.

It is impossible to be all inclusive so as to incorporate all aspects of political and social standards in trade agreements, and neither is this the goal. However, as liberals we must recognize the danger of so-called trade arrangements that are in actuality exclusive and antagonistic to other players. Such arrangements run the risk of diluting the importance of global regimes and the standards of behavior demanded. The long term effects of market integration without basic standards for democratic inclusion, transparency and concern for the environment, might exacerbate the discontent.

Therefore I believe liberals must have a stronger voice in establishing liberal political principles in multilateral global and regional institutions as we move into the next decade, for all of the major challenges we are about to face will require multilateral solutions.

We cannot discuss the major political tasks for the next decade without looking at the issue of the rise of China. As a leader of a political party that has played a key role in creating one of the most successful democratic transitions stories of East Asia, I think it is particularly pertinent that I address this issue. You might accuse me of being biased because of where I am from, the small island nation of Taiwan that is on the frontline of bearing the pressures of China’s rise. But I do genuinely believe that what Taiwan is facing today is what the rest of the world will face in the coming decades, and there is a complex web of political tasks that we must confront in the process.

There is no doubt that China is on the rise. Indeed, given its sheer size and population, China feels that it deserves to be more than a regional player, and that its rise is long overdue. The Chinese leadership has commissioned intensive studies on the rise and fall of great powers, charting its path and developing a global discourse in the process. They acknowledge the historical reality that the rise and fall of world powers have come at great cost, usually war. To alleviate global concern over the disruption of the existing world order, the Chinese have carefully crafted a propaganda strategy which has evolved around the phrases “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development.”

But will the rise really be peaceful? What are the consequences of China’s rise on the rest of the world? And what are the variables where as Liberals we would have some room for influence? The next decade will be a critical period, so let us examine this from several angles: military and security, the environment, economic development, and politics.

Last week the Chinese Liberation Army celebrated the 60^th Anniversary of establishing its modern navy by parading its fleet off the coast of the Port of Qingdao. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Director Bates Gill called it the “coming out party of the Chinese navy.” The demonstration of the previously unseen nuclear submarines and other vessels signified China’s transition from a continental power to a maritime power.

The Chinese defend the development of its blue water navy and the capacity to project military power way beyond its shores as a necessity for ensuring China’s growing global economic interests. However, as a preamble for justifying its use of force offshore, irrelevant to the safety of sea lanes for Chinese ships, China passed a so-called “anti-secession law” in 2005, legitimating the deployment of force in situations THEY determine as violating their territorial integrity. At the moment China has ongoing territorial disputes with India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, and of course Taiwan. And a US Congressional Research report issued last year has warned that one of China’s strategic goals could be a displacement of US military influence, and denial of US access to certain waters in the region. The harassment of US vessels a few months ago, as the Financial Times has described, “is a sign of things to come.” Both the US and Japan have expressed concerns over the lack of transparency in Chinese military spending.

Americans may not be ready to accept a relative decline of American power and a reconfiguration of geostrategic power from uni-polarism to multi-polar centers of military dominance. And military experts will say that it will take more than a decade to match the military strength of the US. However, the appearance of unconventional threats to global security and the over-extension of the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan have affected the weight of American influence in other regions, and China has been more than eager to fill the power vacuum, spreading its influence from Southeast Asia, to Africa and Latin America as well.

Even those critical of hegemonic inclinations of the US as a superpower since the end of the Cold War must ask the question if a new balance of power equation involving Russia and China provides the stability that the world needs in the coming decade. And even optimists who argue that it is possible to defy the historical pattern of the rise and decline of world powers, to facilitate China’s rise in a peaceful way, must not ignore the other international relations premise that democracies tend to be less hostile toward each other. Obviously China is not a democracy, and there is more cause for concern regarding the potential for conflict.

In response to the rising military influence of China and the volatile impact it could potentially have on the stability of the global system, in this critical coming decade, I believe liberals should carry on the following tasks:

1. I urge those of you from the European Union to continue to uphold the moratorium on weapons exports to China. 2. On the political side we must continue to demand greater transparency in the Chinese military modernization program. 3. We must constantly remind China of its responsibilities as a major stakeholder in the preservation of peace and stability. We must continue to call on China to abandon its threat to use force in resolving disputes.

Now let me turn to the economic dimensions of the rise of China. Since the 1980’s, China has pursued a policy of what they call “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which is essentially state-driven economic opening and liberalization. I don’t think anyone would dispute that the strategy of liberalization and opening has been good for China. Even in the global economic downturn, China has been able to maintain an annual growth rate of 8%. Other liberal economies, including political rivals like us, have also enjoyed some of the benefits of China’s liberalization process.

However, there are a number of causes for concern that as liberals we must confront. One major downside of economic development in China has been the tremendous toll on the environment, which will have far-reaching consequences way beyond the Asian continent. While China has in 20 years achieved economic development goals that took a century to attain in the west, even as Chinese officials admit, they have also concentrated a century’s worth of environmental challenges into those 20 years. China today is the world’s largest consumer of coal, oil and steel, and the largest producer of CO2 and chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions.

To back up the energy demand, China is rapidly installing nuclear power plants along its densely populated southeastern coast. I do not need to remind you of the fact that even countries with experienced expert use of nuclear energy – Russia, the United States, and Japan, have encountered “accidents” in the past. In China, any mismanagement or accident in a nuclear power plant will create a humanitarian and environmental disaster of tremendous magnitude.

We cannot entirely invalidate the eco-socialist argument that China’s pollution and environmental challenges are a result of environmental colonialism, of the rich industrialized countries transferring their highly polluting industries to less developed countries. However, this is no excuse for China and the rest of the world to be relieved of immediate responsibility of remedying the severe environmental consequences of their profit driven economic development strategy. And as global liberals, we must especially maintain the moral high-ground in encouraging our governments and the private sector to add an environmental dimension of developing fuel-efficient technology and renewable energy sources in our economic engagements with China.

A second dimension of China’s economic growth I wish to call your attention upon is the question of the developmental model China is exporting to other developing countries. Through foreign aid and targeted investment strategies, China has developed a significant economic stake all around the world. China’s presence is pervasive, in the telecommunications industry of the Philippines and Guatemala, in the coal mines of Colombia, in the oil refineries around the Sahara desert, and of course in various sectors of all or your countries. Some of the economic presence is propelled by the growing capacity of China’s private sector to expand on a multi-national level, but more of it has been state-driven and strategically targeted.

China’s economic power and global presence has an impact on developing nations as they contemplate their own development strategies, and we will realize that much of the political debate of developing societies will focus on division between the characteristics of the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus, although they will not necessarily be applying such terminology.

Whether you agree with the terminology of the Washington Consensus or not (I noticed that following the G-20 summit, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared that the Washington Consensus is over), but characteristics of the consensus, such as fiscal discipline, deregulation, trade liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, and the redirection of indiscriminant public subsidies to pro-growth fundamentals such as education, etc., are consistent with liberal values. However, as I have described in the previous section of this speech, our failure to resolve problems of poverty, exploitation, and corruption in both the public and private sectors leads room to not only Gordon Brown, but more importantly, other developing nations, to have doubts as to whether or not this prescription is the best model.

This is where the Beijing Consensus will step in as an alternative model for development. It is not the cold war ideological confrontation backed by clearly defined alliances and blocs. Countries are constantly evaluating the development choices presented to them, and may well adopt a fusion of various models. While the Beijing Consensus has adapted certain market characteristics and does not rule out innovation and creativity, it puts greater emphasis on material growth over political liberties. It also sanctions the independence of fiscal sovereignty – i.e. the lack of transparency, when confronting external pressure for reform.

The Beijing model of development is promoting what Singapore would have wanted to spread as well: the ideology of confidence in the benevolence of the state and its capacity to manage economic growth without political freedoms and democracy. The economic wealth flaunted by China around the world in its energy procurement and investment strategies will certainly mislead many governments into adopting a similar path. It has also undercut the capacity of OECD countries to make demands in political reforms and fiscal transparency as leverage for providing foreign aid.

This leads me to the final and perhaps most complicated area of coping with China’s rise, and that is in the area of politics and democracy. The democratization of China may well be one of the most important political projects of this century. Although there is tremendous resistance within China to political liberalization, it will be virtually impossible for the state to maintain the kind of control it currently enjoys indefinitely. I have already outlined the dangers of China’s rise without democracy – in its military ambitions and in the economic model it is spreading around the world. The pressures of the rise of China and the disruption to the current world order would be greatly alleviated if China were a democratic state. Among us liberals there is no need to elaborate on the positive values of freedom and democracy. However, what we do need to think about and discuss is how to have an influence on the political liberalization of China.

Many people around the world advocate a strategy of engagement with China, and I do agree that since we are all stakeholders in China’s change, we must engage and have a role in molding that change. Engagement is not a bad idea per se. However, what concerns me is that in the process of engagement, short-term profits and attractive market incentives often steer us away from the bigger picture, and ultimately we will be confronting a much more difficult China if transparency, accountability, fundamental freedoms and human rights are not emphasized.

What you will be facing in the next decade is a much more confident China that is smarter in using its soft power and economic leverage to achieve political ends. We Taiwanese have learned in a painful way, that in negotiating with the Chinese, compromises in fundamental principles will only lead China to expect greater concessions. Instead of changing and liberalizing China, government leaders and policy makers around the world are being silenced on crucial human rights issues. Market access is most often used as political leverage, and as long as people succumb to such pressures and turn away from political arguments, you are also losing an opportunity to make a political difference. And although you may profit in the short run, in the long run you are giving the Chinese party-state a free hand to intervene in the market process. Instead of seeing stronger market fundamentals grow in an economically liberalizing China, allowing the issue of political liberalization to be set aside while engaging China will only breed greater problems of political manipulation, corruption and state domination of the market enterprise.

In the case of Taiwan, although we have our unique issues with China, in the coming decade I do not think we will be the only country facing political intervention from China in our domestic politics. To crush political differences, in addition to outright military threats, China has employed much more sophisticated tactics of divide and conquer, using business interests and infiltration in media organizations to influence our internal democratic process. As a young democracy with our own history of an authoritarian past and continuing existence of transitional justice issues, Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to such pressures. With lofty promises of short-term profit, they are weakening the resolve of some political leaders to uphold the principles of our democracy.

In one month we will be commemorating the 20^th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, an incident of state violence toward which the Chinese government still does not acknowledge any wrongdoing. And as we speak, there are still journalists, scholars and activists whose whereabouts in China are unaccounted for since their disappearance following endorsement of the Charter 08, a declaration of political reform. We must constantly remind ourselves of these realities, even as G-20 nations welcome and look to China as a supposed savior of the global economy.

We are at a crossroads, in an age of uncertainty, with the deepening economic crisis and changing geostrategic configurations. But crisis also provides opportunity. I have spoken in general terms about our need to strengthen multilateral institutions in responding to the ills of the imperfect market economy we have, but specifically I have addressed the matter of the rise of China, not only out of alarm, but out of a hope that as principled liberals you will remain the voice of reason and freedom, that you will uphold political liberalism as you seek to spread the idea of market liberalism. If anyone is going to have an impact the way China evolves and rises, on the way China is integrated with global values, it will be the liberals inside China and around the world who are willing to stand firm in voicing and acting on political liberalism.

These challenges for the next decade will require collective action and coordinated responses. That is why again, I am so pleased and honored to have the opportunity to discuss these questions with other fellow liberals from around the world. As a political party, we have accumulated much experience in fighting authoritarianism, and although we are temporarily defeated we are certainly still in the picture, shouldering the hopes and aspirations of many Taiwanese people. And we hope that with your support and blessing, we will again rise to a position of strength to be able to work with you in bringing about basic freedoms and political liberalism to more regions of the world, including in China.